Much Ado About Nothing

In this article, Jason Shaplen and James Laney summarize the ongoing peace negotiations and the North Korea's disarming of their nuclear weapons and centers. In it, they summarize the progress of the peace negotiations but raise the issue of what will happen to the weapons and the stockpile of the already existing fissile material. Though much progress has been made, to the tune of North Korea's promise of disarming all its nuclear centers, the Beijing talks, and the U.S. aid of $25 million among others things, Shaplen and Laney nevertheless still agree that "Still, the nuclear accord is ambiguous on one issue that threatens to derail it: the question of what will happen to North Korea’s existing stockpile of fissile material".

It is an important question to ask, since more than ever before, Bush has spent resources and efforts to pursuing this end. He has dissolved and stepped over the 6+ years of conflict between hard-line conservatives who want to oust Kim Jong Il's regime and those who favor negotiation, and vested responsibility and power in Christopher Hill, a member of the State Department who is the point man for North Korea. North Korea has thus far mostly, and encouragingly has complied, with much aid from America, of course. But with all this progress with the disarming of nuclear centers and factories, it is just as important to consider the fate of the current stockpile of nuclear items that has been sitting, unused.

This issue is significant. The article cites that North Korea "has reprocessed approximately 50 kilos of weapons-grade plutonium — enough for as many as 10 nuclear bombs — and this stockpile will soon be Mr. Kim’s last remaining card". On the one hand, Kim can hold on to it as a trump card for perhaps, more aid and rights. But on the other hand, giving it up could severely weaken his regime and could mean Kim would be at the mercy of reformists who wish to eradicate his regime.

The article offers a suggestion, one I agree with, that North Korea cede the material to one of its closest allies in China. This would not only allow China to hold on to it, but it would prevent North Korea from making more bombs or selling it to, for example, a terrorist organization for some much needed quick cash on the go. Another important reason why China could be a viable option is that outside organizations, especially ones associated with the U.S., such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, are often distrusted by Kim and North Korea. Case in point would be when he threw out inspectors in 2002. Furthermore, because there is, ultimately, a trust in China that it is not seeking the overthrow of his regime, Kim can rest assured in that respect. In addition, China has mass subsidies and aid that it could use in case North Korea falls out of line.

Whatever the case may be, Korea is a step closer than ever before in uniting, but this issue remains as a hurdle to be cleared. Timing is key and it is just as important as to who will deal with and handle North Korea and its fissile material. But as North Korea becomes more integrated with the rest of the world, and everyone is beginning to acknowledge, as the article states, "the elephant in the room", progress isn't looking too far away.