The Public Intellectual (Part 3 of 3): The Conclusion

In considering the personal status and state of the public intellectual and also their jobs, Stephen Mack makes a good point about where our priorities should be:

it needs to begin with a shift from “categories and class” to “function.” That is, our notions of the public intellectual need to focus less on who or what a public intellectual is—and by extension, the qualifications for getting and keeping the title. Instead, we need to be more concerned with the work public intellectuals must do, irrespective of who happens to be doing it. (Stephen Mack )

As Mack mentions later, “It’s a distinction that matters” because it really is significant regarding whether the public intellectual focuses on his perceived status or his function in society. This dichotomy expresses itself in William Dean’s review, if not a critique, of Richard Posner’s book, Public Intellectuals: A Study of Decline. Essentially, Posner, a federal judge and law professor argues for a variety of factors that have led to the decreasing number and the decline in status of the public intellectuals. However, Dean points out in an example that:

Posner launches into an ill-fated and lengthy exercise in ranking the 571 public intellectuals who in the years 1995-2000 received the most media attention and Web-site hits. None of the great public intellectuals I cite above (from Addams to Lasch) makes Posner's top 100, and three fail to show up among his top 571. Not only is this ranking a ridiculous way to assess real public influence, it undermines Posner's own project; he himself would predict that the ranking would stimulate public intellectuals' vanity, causing them either to preen or be wounded and then to ignore the book's larger argument. (William Dean)

In this example, Dean exposes Posner’s ridiculous method of measuring public influence through something that can be amounted as a popularity contest. Indeed, Posner only grazes the surface, failing to recognize that something as trivial as web site hits is hardly an indication of true influence of a public intellectual. Furthermore, as Dean points out, Posner not only focuses on what he shouldn’t, but fails to give insight on what should matter – the function of the intellectual:

But Posner is not a pragmatist when he disregards public intellectuals who discuss public philosophies and attitudes. These public intellectuals sometimes uncover implicit orientations and worldviews that, in turn, affect public decisions and actions. (William Dean)

Thus, Dean points out the fact that the public intellectual, despite what his standing in or perception by society may be, has an important role, one that can have important effects on a nation and its people. Jean Bethke Elshtain corroborates, stating “the public intellectual needs, it seems to me, to puncture the myth-makers of any era, including his own, […] Public intellectuals, much of the time at least, should be party poopers” (Jean Bethke Elshtain). She implies that the intellectual is to push aside myths and peripheral issues that only get in the way of the only thing that matters – the job of the intellectual, which is essentially to work to expose issues, create awareness and agitate the status quo. Mack concludes this issue in stating:

And so if public intellectuals have any role to play in a democracy—and they do—it’s simply to keep the pot boiling. The measure of public intellectual work is not whether the people are listening, but whether they’re hearing things worth talking about.

Therefore, a public intellectual should not be so concerned with his status as he should be

regarding the state of his profession. As Mack illustrated, there is no need to worry about who

delivers the message, as long as the message is getting delivered. Furthermore, the more one

becomes worried about and convinced of a decline in his status, he will engage in a self-fulfilling

prophecy. That is, in his almost paranoid concern over himself, he will lose focus on what he

should be most concerned about, delivering the message. So in this sort of "moping" and

"whining" which leads to a lack of focus, his concerns will certainly come true. In fact, dealing

with these issues this way will only make the issue worse as the public intellectuals deviate from

what their protocol and in effect become public "complainers" rather than "intellectuals".



In looking over the public intellectuals over the last three weeks, I have explored few of the

many issues that are prominent in the realm of the public intellectuals. Specifically, there have

been analysis of the "paradox" between religion and politics as well as the dichotomy between

status and function of the public intellectual. The common conclusions that were reached in both

cases was that both are still issues still hotly contested today. Indeed, the platform and ideas

have been established on both sides of both issues, and though I have advocated one side for

both issues, this has been but a battle that is part of the war going on in public forums in the rest

of the world. Another common conclusion for both issues that has been overlooked is that, no

matter what, the public intellectual is neither a full intellectual elitist nor an everyman. He is a

synthesis, a medium, of those two seemingly opposite ends. He must remember that in both

issues, he not only speaks for them in certain cases, but speaks to them as well. That is why in

the first issue, the intellectual finds himself contorted by varying viewpoints, beliefs and codes of

conduct. And as for the second issue, there has been too much deviation from the "public" in

favor of the "intellectual". It is in that deviation in which the intellectual forgets his function of

delivering the message, and forgets that he is often the crucial link between the public and the

socio-political world. Indeed, instead of seeing himself and the public as "us", his vision has

blurred to the point that he refers that "us" as "them" and "me". In looking forward, the public

intellectual should remember that its not ultimately his reputation that matters, but rather the

existence of the message of the intellectual and its ability to move society.

The Public Intellectual (Part 2 of 3): The "Decline" of the Public Intellectual?

A second issue that the public intellectual faces is that of his status as well as role in today’s society. To be specific, I believe that the former may be unclear, but the latter remains firmly established. In the case of the former, there have been questions as to whether the public intellectual, as related to his society, has been respected and effective. John Donatich, in a panel discussion, stated:

In preparing for this event, I might as well admit that I've been worried about making the slip, "the future of the public ineffectual." But I think that malapropism would be central to what we'll be talking about. It seems to me that there is a central conflict regarding American intellectual work. How does it reconcile itself with the venerable tradition of American anti-intellectualism? What does a country built on headstrong individualism and the myth of self-reliance do with its people convinced that they know best? (John Donatich)

The issue he raises is an important one. Worrying about the effectiveness of the public intellectual, or the “ineffectual”, he raises the point that there is a tension that needs to be reconciled. That is, he points out the culture of anti-intellectualism in America as butting heads with the public intellectual, resulting in the latter’s loss of credibility. But Mack contends in his response to this that the myth of America's anti-intellectual is just that, a myth:

One, the fact that academic institutions wield enormous financial, technological, and cultural power—and the fact that, more generally, education continues to be the centerpiece of some of our most cherished social myths (i.e., “the “American Dream”)—are both powerful reasons to doubt that Americans suffer from some instinctive hostility to intellectuals. Two, what is sometimes identified as anti-intellectualism is in fact intellectual—that is, a well articulated family of ideas and arguments that privilege the practical, active side of life (e.g., work) over the passive and purely reflective operations of the mind in a vacuum. (Stephen Mack)

I might agree that this myth of the hostile everyman opposed to the aristocratic elite is just a myth, but I would say that the two reasons he states are exaggerated for effect. First, while "the American Dream" and the idea of education are well hallowed in America's society, it doesn't reveal the fact that even in this, there is a division of the haves and the have-nots in education. Some go on to be the public intellectuals, while others go on to be laborers, and to a certain extent, there will always be some discontent from the latter towards the former. After all, it was the founding fathers, the public intellectuals of their day, who founded America, not the farmers and uneducated. In fact, it was the latter who tried overthrowing the government multiple times in incidents such as Shay’s Rebellion. For Mack's second point, he might define the anti-intellectualism as something entirely something it claims to be the opposite of -- intellectualism. To be fair, some may have properly educated and rational set of ideas and articulations that govern their "anti-intellectualism". But on the other side, some may just be ones who harbor hostility to intellectualism out of spite and emotions and not much more. But, even if we accept that anti-intellectualism actually ends up being intellectualism, it doesn't necessarily show the myth of anti-intellectualism to be false as much as it shows those dogging anti-intellectuals to be unintentionally hypocritical.

Not only are the intellectuals facing hostilities from critics and public alike, but they experience their share of distrust. Jean Bethke rationalizes that “Democracy requires laws, constitutions and authoritative institutions, but it also depends on what might be called democratic dispositions". When she specifies on those democratic dispositions, however, she reveals "We find deepening cynicism; the growth of corrosive forms of isolation, boredom, and despair; the weakening, in other words, of that world known as democratic civil society, a world of groups and associations and ties that bind"(Jean Bethke Elshtain). So in this reality of skepticism and cynicism, which hasn’t exactly been helped by the Iraq War, the public’s distrust and hostility are often exacerbated. In essence, she says that a democratic system built on these dispositions on the part of the public crumbles when it erodes. And as a result, not only do the heads of the state and government suffer, but so do the public intellectuals, who are often seen in the same light as those very politicians.

The Public Intellectual (Part 1 of 3): The Public Intellectual, Religion And Politics

The concept of the public intellectual has at times been mired in anonymity and tension. Many people wonder just who or what a public intellectual is, what their role encompasses, when and where they operate and most importantly, why they do what they do. From one perspective, they appear to be public commentators on issues of today, but on the other hand, they appear to be dissenters. On the matters of public intellectuals, many argue over issues such as whether they are to be guided and, to a certain extent, restricted in their rhetoric. Indeed, questions are raised in which people wonder if these intellectuals truly are public commentators governed by their own opinions and belief systems, or whether they are merely the mouthpiece of the American public, compromising their personal beliefs in favor of representing the public opinion. Coupled with an ever changing world and media along with the growing uncertainty of his role, the public intellectual faces these challenges. One of these complicating challenges is the issue of the dichotomy involving politics and religion. Is the public intellectual to argue by logic, reason and politics? Or do his own personal convictions and religious beliefs shape his rhetoric? The two major problems that seem to be plaguing the public intellectual seems to be how they are to reconcile the roles of logic and politics and personal religion in public forums and second, what the role of the intellectual is in the present day and if they are facing a possible decline in society.

In looking over America’s past, the 200+ year old nation’s beginnings have been inundated with politics and religion. After all, the beginnings of America is laced with countless numbers of Puritan colonials, such as John Winthrop, leaving England for a new beginning, politically and religiously, in America. It’s seen in many other points in our history as well. This study reveals the fact that the founding fathers, the 56 signers of the Declaration of the Independence all had religious affiliations. Another incidence shows up in the first amendment in guaranteeing the freedom of religion and speech among other rights. In this example, the fate of religion and press and speech are intertwined. The irony is, our nation whose foundation has roots in these two ideologies also is at the same time, divided by them. As Stephen Mack put it, “they are, more or less, alienated kindred vying for the same space in the human imagination”. Mack makes the point that religion and politics have been driving forces that give our lives a purposeful meaning and a sense of existence but at the same time, paradoxically polarizes society as a whole. Indeed, any unity that has existed between the two has been uneasy. In fact, it was as early as 1635 when Roger Williams highlighted the tension between church and politics when he was kicked out by the Massachusetts colony for being critical of their mixing of religion and politics.


As this nation continues to witness the dichotomy of religion and politics, the public intellectual finds himself in the middle of this mess, deafened by the polarizing results. However, as polarizing as these forces have been, there is historical precedence in there being some coexistence, albeit an uneasy one. Thus, it makes more difficult for the public intellectual to determine where he stands in the middle of that mess. In fact, it has become an issue of “either us or them” in public debating, which is for the intellectual, a key aspect of his existence. Do they stick to the language of politics and logic, supposedly the language of the public masses or base their rhetoric on personal belief and religion? For the former, Peter Beinart of The New Republic states:

It's fine if religion influences your moral values. But, when you make public arguments, you have to ground them--as much as possible--in reason and evidence, things that are accessible to people of different religions, or no religion at all. Otherwise, you can't persuade other people, and they can't persuade you. In a diverse democracy, there must be a common political language, and that language can't be theological. (Beinart)

and for the latter, Stephen Mack countered with two flaws that arise out of Beinart’s argument. First, it’s hard to argue for the lack of credibility of religion in public debate and conduct when America’s history has been one filled with and shaped by “activist theologians from the right and the left”. Second, as Hugh Heclo put it, Beinart’s demand “amounts to a demand that religious believers be other than themselves and act publicly as if their faith is of no real consequence”. This is a conundrum that has personal implications for me. Personally speaking, I am a Christian, and yet, I find myself actually agreeing with the side that I shouldn’t, that is, I understand Beinart’s rationale that religion is something that is not a common language and thus won't appeal to everyone. I also understand that having been built on logic and reason, those should still be the only things driving public debating to this day. However, the essence of being a public intellectual, I believe, is in expressing your views and opinions and how they relate to the matters of the world today. And it goes without saying that, to be deprived of your fundamental beliefs and religion means to lack the passion and core values that shape your arguments in the first place. I believe that just as the fate of freedom of religion and speech were intertwined in the First Amendment, it should hold true in public debate today. For anyone who calls themselves a public intellectual, they owe it to not only the public, but for themselves to stick to what they believe in.

I believe though, much of the skepticism regarding the church-state and any derivatives of, comes from examples that are of a national level. On an individual level, in public forums, what I believe is that one should always be governed by what they know and believe, otherwise, their rhetoric comes off as nothing but a resounding gong. However, at the national level, things are a little unclearer, even as a Christian. Not everyone is of the same religion, but political regimes and governments are institutions that usually have the approval of the majority, even if it is an uneasy one. On the one hand, many of the basics and beginnings of America, the right of the individual for one, and many movements such as abolitionism of slavery, women's suffrage and civil rights all drew upon these basic human rights and Christian values. And the point that Mack makes from one side is that:

(John) Winthrop teaches us that a people deeply committed to a religiously inspired vision of society will inevitably try to make that vision law. And our history teaches us that American democracy would not be nearly so liberal or humane if they hadn't. In the American experience, in short, religion and civil society are political codependents. (Stephen Mack)

Thus, in one respect, many of the greater political developments have risen out of a Christian foundation, but the skepticism expressed by those like Beinart grows when people are aware of Roger Williams' recognition of the fact that Mack reveals, that, "this codependency had a dark side". That the fear of religion mixing with politics isn't mostly due to its clashing with people's beliefs, though it plays a part, but rather it seems a dangerous contradiction to them that a democracy, which is built on compromise, teamwork and tolerance, could be headed by religious zealots whose personal beliefs can only be defined as being uncompromising. Luckily, the role of the public intellectual is one that isn't of any formal affiliation or official position, but one that is guided, at its root, by the same right that the rest of us possess, that is, our freedom of religion, speech, press and assembly. In fact, if a public intellectual were to be involved at the national level in some level of government, there would be a very dangerous risk that not only would the political leadership be compromised, but also their own personal beliefs. By entering politics and their religion into a melting pot, not only is the reputation of their religion at stake, but their conduct as called for by their religion is likely to come into conflict with political duties. Alexis de Tocqueville wrote on this point that when religious leaders become politicians, they end up having to possibly "defend allies who are such from interest rather than from love".

It is an interesting paradox that even when you think you have it figured out, you find yourself back at square one. Because I believe that the role of the public intellectual is limited to that as a third party, non-political citizen, for reasons which will be explored later, the complications that arise from the national level cannot impede him. That is, because his role finds its roots in public forums and speech, and I argued earlier that he has the right and also the responsibility to stay true to his beliefs, his role is clear. Now if we were talking politicians, that would be a different story.